The Battle of Culloden: A Military Examination
The Battle of Culloden on 16 April 1746 was not simply a defeat — it was a catastrophe for the Jacobite army, decisive and complete within less than an hour. Understanding why requires examining the military decisions on both sides, the ground chosen, and the respective strengths and weaknesses of the two forces.
The Armies
The Jacobite Army
By April 1746, the Jacobite army was a shadow of the force that had won at Prestonpans. Months of campaign in difficult conditions, the failed march to Derby and retreat, the drawn battle at Falkirk, and the gruelling Highland winter had taken their toll. The army was underfed, exhausted, and had suffered significant desertion.
The core fighting strength was the Highland clans: Cameron, MacDonald (multiple branches), Fraser (elements), Mackintosh, Stewart of Appin, Athollmen, and others. These were genuine fighting men with real experience and commitment. But they were supported by a mixed tail of less experienced recruits, small French regular contingents, and a dysfunctional command structure marked by mutual distrust between Charles and Lord George Murray.
Artillery: the Jacobites had several cannon but few experienced gunners, and their guns were outmatched by the government's heavier and better-served pieces.
Total strength at Culloden: approximately 5,000–5,500 men.
The Government Army
Cumberland's army was a professional fighting force in good condition. Having wintered at Aberdeen, the troops were well supplied, well trained, and had specifically prepared for the challenge of the Highland charge.
The infantry regiments were experienced and disciplined. The cavalry — dragoons and hussars — were well mounted and fresh. The artillery was powerful: heavy cannon positioned to enfilade the Jacobite lines.
Cumberland had taken specific steps to prepare his men for Highland warfare. He had drilled them in the anti-targe bayonet technique (stabbing right rather than straight ahead) and briefed officers and NCOs on what to expect from a Highland charge.
Total strength at Culloden: approximately 8,000–9,000 men.
Lord George Murray: The Jacobite General
Lord George Murray (1694–1760) was the outstanding military talent on the Jacobite side. A veteran of the 1715 and 1719 risings who had subsequently served the government, he joined Charles in 1745 and became Lieutenant General of the Jacobite army.
Murray's campaign management was impressive throughout. He recognised that the Jacobite army's strengths — speed, shock, close-quarters ferocity, intimate knowledge of Highland terrain — required guerrilla tactics and the avoidance of set-piece battles on open ground. He won a brilliant night engagement at the skirmish of Clifton Moor during the retreat from England. His wing at Falkirk performed excellently.
His relationship with Charles became increasingly toxic. Murray resented Charles's over-reliance on Irish and French advisers with limited knowledge of Highland warfare. Charles resented Murray's constant opposition to his more ambitious proposals. By Culloden, the two men were barely on speaking terms.
Murray's preference was to retreat into the Highlands and continue the campaign. In a letter written on the eve of Culloden — delivered to Charles in the early hours of 16 April — he laid out his concerns about the ground and proposed an alternative. Charles ignored it.
At Culloden itself, Murray commanded the right wing, which launched the most effective part of the charge. The right wing briefly broke through the government first line (Barrel's Regiment suffered significant casualties) before being overwhelmed by flanking fire and numbers.
The Ground: Drummossie Moor
The choice of Drummossie Moor as the battleground has been debated by historians ever since. The decision was effectively Charles's — he and his Irish advisers favoured the site. Murray was opposed.
The moor is flat, open, and boggy in places. It gave the Jacobites none of their tactical advantages:
- The Highland charge required firm ground for speed; the boggy moor slowed it
- There was no cover from artillery fire — the entire Jacobite line was exposed to direct fire from the moment the battle began
- The flanks were not secured by natural features — the Jacobite right was eventually enfiladed by fire from government troops on the enclosure walls to the south
- The 650-yard gap between the two armies was wider than optimal for a Highland charge — the clansmen had to advance under sustained fire for longer than at Prestonpans
An alternative site, approximately two miles away on rising, broken ground, would have been far more suitable for Highland tactics. Murray identified it. Charles rejected it.
The Night March to Nairn: A Gamble That Failed
On the night of 15 April, the Jacobite commanders attempted a bold stroke: a night march to attack Cumberland's camp at Nairn, where the government army was celebrating Cumberland's 25th birthday. The plan was to strike at dawn, catching the enemy partially incapacitated by celebrations.
The plan was strategically sound but logistically impossible given the condition of the army. The column became disordered in the darkness. Progress was desperately slow. By around 02:00 on 16 April, it was clear that dawn would come before the column was in position. The march was abandoned.
The Jacobite army returned to Culloden — having marched 10 miles in darkness without food or adequate rest — and went into whatever bivouacs and shelter was available. Many men lay down on the heather and slept. Some went foraging for food. When Cumberland's army advanced in the morning, a significant proportion of the Jacobite force was not in position.
The Battle: Sequence of Events
The Artillery Exchange
Cumberland's army moved forward in the morning of 16 April in three lines of infantry, flanked by cavalry. The Jacobite army drew up in their own battle line, the army roughly orientated north-south.
The battle opened with an artillery exchange. The government guns — heavier and better served — quickly found their range. The Jacobite artillery was ineffective. For approximately twenty minutes, the Jacobite lines stood in the open, taking casualties from artillery fire, unable to advance until the order came.
The psychological and physical effect of this bombardment was severe. Men in the Jacobite centre and left — particularly the MacDonald regiments on the far left — watched comrades fall and the line contract without being able to respond.
The Charge: Right Wing Success, Centre and Left Failure
When the order to charge finally came, the results were uneven. On the right wing — where the Camerons, Mackintoshes, Athollmen, and Stewarts of Appin were positioned — the charge was ferocious and largely successful at close quarters. They covered the ground quickly, broke through the government front line (particularly through Barrel's Regiment), and briefly reached the second line. But they were flanked from the enclosure to their right, took fire from the flanks, and ultimately could not sustain the breakthrough without support from the centre.
In the centre, the advance was slower. The ground was more boggy. The men were more tired. The government musketry was devastating. Many of the Jacobite centre units did not reach the government lines at all.
On the left wing, the MacDonald regiments — traditionally given the place of honour on the right flank, which had been awarded to the Camerons and Athollmen this day — advanced slowly and, by most accounts, never fully committed to the charge. Whether this was due to the sloping ground, the demoralising effect of the artillery, their anger at their placement, or simple tactical reality is debated. They took heavy casualties from musketry and eventually broke.
The Rout and Pursuit
Within thirty minutes of the charge being ordered, the Jacobite army was in rout. Cumberland's cavalry swept around both flanks, cutting down retreating clansmen. The pursuit was relentless — the government cavalry rode down fugitives for miles around the battlefield. Many of the heaviest Jacobite casualties occurred not in the battle itself but in the pursuit.
Charles Edward Stuart was persuaded to leave the field — against his wishes, by some accounts — and was escorted away by a small group of cavalry. He began the long flight that ended with his escape to France in September 1746.
Why Did the Jacobites Lose?
The military historians have reached broad consensus on the factors:
- Wrong ground: Drummossie Moor gave the government's superior artillery and discipline every advantage
- Exhaustion: the failed night march left the Jacobite army without sleep or food before the battle
- Government preparation: Cumberland's anti-targe tactic was specifically designed to neutralise the Highland charge
- Firepower imbalance: the government had more and better guns, better supplied muskets, and better-trained infantry
- Divided command: the mutual distrust between Charles and Murray meant decisions were not made quickly or well
- Insufficient numbers: the government army was nearly twice the size
What is remarkable is not that the Jacobites lost — given the above — but that parts of the charge nearly succeeded. The right wing's brief breakthrough at Barrel's Regiment was as close as the Jacobite cause would ever come to winning at Culloden. In different conditions, on different ground, the Highland charge might have prevailed one more time.